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Abstract 
In this study, a comparative performance analysis between state-owned and privately-owned 
commercial banks of Turkey is carried out over the period between 1997 and 2006. On the con-
trary to expectations, statistical findings of the study produce surprising results. The results sug-
gest that state-owned banks are as efficient as private banks, and even more efficient at some as-
pects. Thus, it rises the question of ‘‘whether to privatize banks or not?’’ 
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1. Introduction 
Since financial system is vital for an economy and banks play a pivotal role in the financial sys-
tem, it is important for economies to have a sound financial and banking system. In this concept, 
liberalization policies have been employed all over the world especially after the 1980s. Turkey 
has been in a change in economic sense from closed to more liberal structures. As a result, finan-
cial sectors and especially banking sector have been in a gradual evolution towards to liberal struc-
ture. 
The current picture of Turkey’s banking industry gives us the chance of addressing the issue of 
government banks’ relative performance. This is important for both the rationale behind bank pri-
vatization and the policy implications. In addition, it provides valuable information for further 
researches to make meaningful comparisons before and after privatization performances of gov-
ernment banks when their privatizations are observed in the future. 
According to market forces theory, private banks have an advantage over state banks with respect to 
financial and operating efficiency. However, our study suggests that government banks are as profit-
able as private banks. The study, firstly, updates the regarded findings with most current data on 
Turkish banking industry. Secondly, most studies of this kind apply economies of scale and technical 
productivity measures whereas our study uses operating efficiency and profitability as the measures. 
This study is organized on three main parts. In the first part, theoretical and empirical researches 
related to the subject, are supplied. In the following part, a summary on the history and working of 
banking system in Turkey is given. The data set employed is described in the third part. Testable 
hypotheses, methodology and empirical findings are also supplied in this part. Finally, the paper 
completes with conclusion. 
2. Literature Review 
Despite the common belief that the purpose in state-ownership of bank is to provide financing for 
projects with low profile of profitability yet necessary for macroeconomic goods and development, 
empirical studies in literature suggest differently. Like many other researchers, La Porta et al. 
(2002), Caprio and Peria (2000) and Barth et al. (2001) report that state ownership of banks does 
not serve the purpose of promoting economic growth and development but even lead to worsening 
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economic development. Moreover, they argue that banking crises are linked with bank ownership 
of governments since political goals may prevent government banks to operate in their original 
path to serve for economic development and growth. 
Since governments continue to own banks in most economies, with the exception of the US, such 
studies regarding bank performance cannot ignore the role of government in the banking business. 
In this respect, the role of governments in the industry goes beyond the regulation. When a gov-
ernment controls financial resources and has the ability to direct those resources to politically-
motivated projects through banks, there appears a possibility for corruption of public funds. This is 
especially the case for developing and underdeveloped countries that also lack a sound legal sys-
tem. Despite the supporters of development view in the 1960s and 1970s, empirical findings of 
many researches like World Bank report (2001), Galindo and Micco (2004), Sapienza (2004), 
Dinc (2005), and Micco et al. (2007) are consistent with the political view. 
It should be also noted that here arises an important discussion issue in government bank ownership 
and performance. That is, as argued by Yevati et al. (2004), state-owned banks should be evaluated 
by their function on stabilizing effect but not by their profitability. The researchers underline the im-
portance of causality issue that exists between government bank ownership and such variables as 
economic development, growth, and corruption. Furthermore, they also introduce new findings 
which suggest that state bank ownership’s negative effects on financial development and growth are 
not as robust as thought earlier. Their study provides evidence showing that state-owned banks may 
play a positive role in reducing credit pro-cyclicality as in the case of Latin American economies. 
Findings in favor of state-owned banks are also reported by Bonin et al. (2005), Yevati et al. (2004), 
and Micco and Panizza (2004). For example, Bonin et al. (2005) report that private ownership alone 
does not assure bank efficiency in transition countries. In addition, Micco and Panizza (2004) suggest 
that state-owned banks may play a positive role in credit-smoothing. 
Nevertheless, efficiency studies on banks have been producing contradictory results. This is 
probably attributable to one or more of country, timing, measure and methodology specific rea-
sons. For instance, Omran (2007) analyzes both private and government banks’ relative perform-
ances and also evaluates bank privatization process in Egypt by comparing the pre- and post-
privatization performances of privatized banks; and reports that private banks outperform govern-
ment banks. On the other hand, carried out a study on a developed country other than the US, Al-
tunbas et al. (2001) provide evidence that government banks in Germany are as efficient as their 
private counterparts. 
The issue of reasons behind governments’ motivation to own banks is also another popular side of 
the topic grabbing researchers’ attention. In this respect, considering that government bank-
ownership is still common in this global modern world1, several studies attempt to reveal reasons 
behind state bank-ownership. Among conclusions, first, government bank ownership is positively 
associated with countries’ level of poverty and underdevelopment (e.g., Barth (2001), La Porta et 
al. (2002), and Beck and Levine (2002)).  
Second, countries’ legal structure appears to be a key determinant that affects government bank-
ownership. Studies of La Porta et al. (1998 and 1999) reflect that in civil law countries, especially 
French civil law countries, government intervention into economic life is much broader than in 
common law countries. Here, it is worth noting that Turkish legal system takes its place in French 
civil law origin. Therefore, the government’s role in the banking industry has been much deeper 
and effective in Turkey. With respect to Turkish banking industry, Isik and Hassan (2003) exam-
ine productivity growth, efficiency change, and technical progress in Turkish commercial banks by 
employing a DEA-type Malmquist Total Factor Productivity Change Index. Their study suggests 
that private banks began to close performance gap with government banks as of 1993. 
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3. The Current View of the Turkish Banking Industry 
1. General Outlook 
Banks in Turkey fall into two groups of scope; one is commercial banks and the other is invest-
ment and development banks, which do not accept deposits. As of 2006, there are 46 banks – 
down from 79 in year 2000 – in the business, of which 33 are commercial banks, and 13 are in-
vestment and development banks. Those 3 of commercial banks are state-owned, and 14 are pri-
vately owned. Due to investment flow from abroad, both the number of foreign-owned banks and 
the capital share of foreign investors in banking industry have increased recently. Foreign inves-
tors have acquired a total of 50% share, which remains in not publicly-traded portion of total capi-
tal, in two privately-owned commercial banks. There are 15 banks in commercial and 4 banks in 
investment and development banking groups where majority stakes (over 50% of total equity) are 
held by foreign banking organizations1. With respect to total assets, five largest banks constitute 
63%, and ten largest banks constitute 86% of total assets in the market. The largest three’s sum of 
total assets amounts to (54+51+41=) 146 billion dollars (The Banks Association of Turkey, 2007). 
2. Legal Environment and Regulatory Institutions 
Banks operated in Turkey are subject to ‘‘Banking Law Nr. 5411’’ last amended in 2005. Estab-
lished in 2000, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA or BDDK in Turkish) is 
the legal authority regulating the industry (http://www.bddk.org.tr). Its main purpose is to maintain 
a healthy and well-functioning banking sector in order for enhancing the financial stability of 
Turkish economy. Since it is a newly established institution, BRSA’s broad responsibilities range 
from assuring the efficiency and transparency of the sector to fostering the integration of Turkish 
banking industry with global financial markets. 
The deposit insurance system in Turkey functions under the authority of the Savings Deposit In-
surance Fund (SDIF or TMSF in Turkish), which is established in 1999 and started its operations 
in 2000 (http://www.tmsf.org.tr). Its autonomous structure allows it to protect depositors’ rights 
under deposit insurance fund. Due to Turkey’s financial crisis of 2001, there has also been an on-
going unconventional duty of the SDIF. That is, the fund has been either privatizing or liquidating 
the banks that became dysfunctional and risky for the system, after taking over their complete 
ownership and management, and taking necessary measures to restructure them. So far from the 
beginning of 2001 financial crisis, overall, both the BRSA and the SDIF have satisfactorily served 
the public interest. 
4. Statistical Analyses 
1. Data and Methodology 
The data used in the study are gathered from the annual balance sheets and income statements of 
commercial banks, published by the Banks Association of Turkey. The data cover a ten-year pe-
riod between 12-31-1997 and 9-31-2006. Due to the differences in their unique scope, investment 
and development banks are not included in the study. Instead, we rather perform our analysis on 
the commercial banks. 
In the application part of this study, the main goal is discovering whether there are any perform-
ance differences or not between government and private banking in Turkey. Profitability and oper-
ating efficiency are chosen to test the hypotheses of this study. Net Profit-Loss (NPL), Return on 
Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) are the proxies used to measure profitability indicator. 
Net profit and net asset efficiencies relative to total employment and total number of branches are 
used to measure operating efficiency.  
                                                          
1 The Savings Deposit Insurance Fund currently controls the other remaining commercial bank known as The Fund Bank 
that was emerged from the consolidation of those risky commercial banks whose ownerships were previously claimed by 
the SDIF. 
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A non-parametric approach is used to see whether private banks perform better than public ones. 
In order to analyze performance differences, mean values and all other statistics are calculated by 
using E-Views 5.1. Following the calculations, t tests are used for mean equality hypotheses. The 
simple format used in the hypotheses is as follows: 
H0:  
pr
iμ = pubiμ  
H1:  
pr
iμ ≠ pubiμ  
Notes: 1) Superscript pr means private 
 2) Superscript pub means public 
 3) Subscript i means the proxy to measure profitability or operating efficiency. 
Pre-test expectations about the performances of public and private banking are as follows: Turkish 
economy has a more liberal structure compared to the 1980s since market forces are expected to 
work in all sectors. In this respect, it is expected that privately owned firms perform better. There-
fore the primary hypothesis of this study is: “Performance efficiency will be better for private 
banks than for state banks”. All testable hypotheses are given below in Table 1.  
 Most of the performance criteria researches on banking sector are specifically about the conse-
quences of privatization (e.g., Omran (2007), Bonin et al. (2005), Clarke et al. (2005)). These stud-
ies basically compare financial and operating performances of firms before and after privatization. 
Most of these studies find that (e.g., Omran (2007), Nakane and Weintraub (2005), Clarke et al. 
(2005)) firms show better performances after privatization. The very first idea of this study 
emerges at this point. There is no serious example for privatization of Turkish state banks to get 
data to use in this context until the mid of 2007. Then we decided that the performance comparison 
of current state and private banks should have been analyzed in Turkey. This analysis firstly aims 
to compare the financial and operating efficiency in the banking sector. Secondly, it is targeted to 
get beneficial results on the performances of government and private banking before privatization 
initiates in the sector. 
2. Empirical Findings 
We could not reach strong evidence that the mean levels of profitability and operating efficiency 
of state and private banks are statistically different than each other. In fact, other than net as-
sets/total employment and net assets/total number of branches, all 5 proxies to measure profitabil-
ity and operating efficiency could be accepted as the same for private and state banks according to 
our statistical test results. 
When the profitability performances of state and private banks are compared, it is found that statis-
tically, there are no meaningful differences in means. Three proxies are used to test whether profit-
ability performances are different or not. When net profit/loss levels are controlled, it could be 
easily observed from Table 2 that state banks’ net profits are much higher than those of private 
banks. However, this difference is loosing its meaning when standard deviations are taken into 
account. t value is 0.8 at most and the test gave the result of no difference. Similar results are seen 
when ROA and ROE figures of state and private banks are employed. It could not be claimed that 
government banking or private banking would give better results in terms of these ratios. How-
ever, when mean values are taken into account, there is a difference relative to net profit figures. 
This time, private banks have stronger means than state banks. Still, t test reports no difference in 
means in terms of ROA and ROE statistically. When the results are gathered to see general view in 
terms of profitability, it is found that there is no performance difference between state and private 
banks in Turkey for the period between 1997 and 2006. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Testable Hypotheses 
Characteristics Proxies Hypotheses 
Profitability Net Profit-Loss (NPL) 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
Return on Equity/ROE) 
NPLpub = NPLpr 
ROApub = ROApr 
ROEpub = ROEpr 
Operating Efficiency Net profit efficiency 
(NPE1)=Net profit/Total employment 
(NPE2) = Net profit/ Total number of 
branches 
Net Assets efficiency 
(NAE1)= Net assets/Total employment 
(NAE2) = Net assets/Total number of 
branches 
NPEpub = NPEpr 
 
 
 
 
 
NAEpub= NAEpr 
 
Table 2 
Results of the Tests for Equality of Means 
Series (profitability) t value probability 
NPLpub and NPLpr 0.793695 0.4406 
ROApub and ROApr 1.022220 0.3240 
ROEpub and ROEpr 0.900845 0.3829 
Series ( op. efficiency)   
NPE1pub and  NPE1pr 1.141059 0.2730 
NPE2pub and NPE2pr 1.126098 0.2791 
NAE1pub and  NAE1pr 2.486524* 0.0261* 
NAE2pub and NAE2pr 2.751269* 0.0156* 
Notes:  1) Mean equality tests are employed by using E-Views 5.1. 
 2) α = 0.05 has been chosen. 
 3) * means that null hypothesis would be rejected. 
Table 3 
Means and Std. Deviations 
Variables Means Std. Dev. Variables Means Std. Dev. 
NPLpub 187163.3 442519.0 NPE1pub 5.121037 10.51161 
NPLpr 58739.49 116720.6 NPE1pr 0.815993 1.838802 
ROApub 0.007932 0.021503 NPE2pub 96.96191 199.1822 
ROApr 0.118511 0.305211 NPE2pr 16.45138 34.91234 
ROEpub 0.144830 0.437541 NAE1pub 367.5774 335.2287 
ROEpr 0.351741 0.480206 NAE1pr 68.79432 55.95432 
NAE2pr 1337.510 1116.895 NAE2pub 7350.252 6079.625 
Note: Except for ratios, all figures are in thousand New Turkish Liras. 
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In order to see whether there is any difference between government and private banking in terms 
of operating efficiency, net profit-loss and net assets are presented in terms of total employment 
and total number of branches. After the tests, there is no clear conclusion to say that private banks 
show better results than state-owned ones in operating efficiency performances. The contradiction 
is coming from the proxies’ definition. When net profit-loss is used, whether in terms of employ-
ment or branches, t values are so small that we could not reject the null hypothesis stating that op-
erating efficiency in terms of net profit-loss is the same for private and state banks. On the other 
hand, when net assets are used in description of operating efficiency, the test results became the 
opposite of those acquired when net profit-loss is used. This time, t test concludes that means of 
net assets/total employment and net assets/total number of branches are statistically different be-
tween state and private banks. In operating efficiency sense, two proxies gave two opposite results, 
and it is found that in terms of operating performances, there is inconclusive result on whether 
government or private banking shows better performance. 
As a result of our analyses, it could be claimed that there is no clear difference between govern-
ment and private banking in terms of profitability and operating efficiency performances in Turkey 
between 1997 and 2006. State banks have much higher mean values of net profit, net profit effi-
ciency and net asset efficiency relative to private banks. In terms of ROA and ROE private banks 
seem to perform better results. However, when statistical tests are run, the whole picture gets new 
meanings. These mean differences in related indicators are loosing their values in terms of statisti-
cal meanings.  
5. Conclusion 
Although bank privatizations have accelerated all over the world since the beginning of the 1990s, 
the case of Turkey reflects unique consequences. Turkish banking industry has not gone into priva-
tization process, at least in conventional ways. Even more interestingly, a number of troubled pri-
vate banks have been nationalized after the financial crisis of 2001. Despite the fact that they were 
either liquidated or sold to private capital again after restructuring, this cannot be treated as priva-
tization. Therefore, we currently had the chance to identify relative performances of government 
and private banks, and to reach insights whether our results are in line with findings on other coun-
tries’ experiences. 
First, it should be noted that even though the number of government banks are considerably less 
than that of private banks, government banks’ financial figures are massive in amount. That is at-
tributable to their much larger sizes as a result of over branching.  
The study’s statistical test results clearly show that performance of state-owned banks does not 
differ from that of private banks with respect to the proxies employed. Moreover, government 
banks even outperform their private counterparts. The results are important for both the rationale 
behind bank privatization and the policy implications. Moreover, the study provides valuable in-
formation for further researches to make meaningful comparisons before and after privatization 
performances of state banks when their privatization occurs in the future. Majority of privatization 
studies in the literature stand in favor of privatization regarding both non-banking and banking 
firms. However, there are a number of studies presenting inconclusive results. As opposed to the 
majority, our study finds its place in the latter. Its findings make bank privatization questionable, 
at least for the Turkish case. Therefore, it is worth rethinking about bank privatization. 
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